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means has little if any opportunity to withdraw or revoke? Moreover,
is a principle of contract law to be made subject to variations in postal
regulations? It is believed that the rule of Adams v. Lindsell is the
better view. It can make little practical difference to the offeror if the
offeree withdraws his acceptance, because the offeror will not act in
reliance on the contract until an acceptance is received. There are
cases decided after adoption of the Postal Regulations of 1913 in which
the doctrine of Adams v. Lindsell was followed. However, these postal
regulations were not called to the attention of the court.", Even so, it
is believed that these cases reach the better result, and that an ac-
ceptance should become effective when posted.
1'7
ROBERT A. PALmER
FEDERAL ESTATE TAXATION-SOME PROBLEMS IN
APPORTIONMENT (IN THE ABSENCE OF WILL PROVISION
OR IN INTESTATE ESTATES)
The federal estate tax is calculated in much the same manner as the
federal income tax. There is a determination of the gross taxable
estate,' from which are subtracted the allowable deductions and ex-
emptions.2 The resulting sum is defined as the net taxable estate and
upon this sum the tax is based.3 The responsibility of paying the tax
is on the personal representative of the estate.4 The "Gross Estate," as
defined by the Internal Revenue Code, includes not only real and per-
sonal property of the decedent which passes by will or by intestacy
but also interests which are not subject to administration (sometimes
termed non-testamentary interests) such as life insurance proceeds,
joint and community property, property over which the decedent held
a power of appointment, gifts in contemplation of death, transfers in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, and
trusts subject to amendment or revocation. ' As noted above, payment
of the tax on these non-testamentary interests is made the responsi-
bility of the personal representative, regardless of the fact that such
property may never come within his control.6
16Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, 65 F. 2d 864 (C.C.A. 8th 1933); Shubert
Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 Fed. 827, 20 A.L.R. 846 (C.C.A. 2d 1921); J. R.
Watldns Co. v. Hill, 214 Ala. 507, 108 S. 244 (1926); International Transp. Ass'n
v. Des Moines Morris Plan Co., 215 Iowa 268, 245 N.W. 244 (1932); McAlister
v. Klein, 81 Okla. 291, 198 P. 506 (1921).
17 The risk thereby placed on the offeror can be avoided by conditioning the
offer so as to require receipt of the letter of acceptance.
1 26 U.S.C. sec. 811. 2 26 U.S.C. see. 812.
3 26 U.S.C. see. 810. 4 26 U.S.C. see. 822 (b).
5 26 U.S.C. see. 811. 6 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, see. 81.76.
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A real problem necessarily evolving from the fact that the federal
estate tax is imposed on property not part of the estate for administra-
tion purposes, relates to the burden of the tax. Is the beneficiary of
the property increasing the taxable estate though not subject to ad-
ministration liable to the personal representative for that portion of
the tax attributable to such property or must the entire tax be paid
from the residuary estate or personal property without reimbursement
from the beneficiary of such property?
The History and General Principles. Prior to 1942 there was uncer-
tainty in the United States both as to whether the estate tax was to be
apportioned among the beneficiaries of the property comprising the
taxable estate in proportion to the benefit received by each and whether
the states could determine the ultimate burden of the tax.7 Although
the estate tax had been in effect for twenty-five years, the federal law
did not fx the burden of the tax except insofar as Internal Revenue
Code sections 826 (c) and (d) provide that unless the decedent
directs otherwise the executor shall be entitled to recover a ratable
share of the tax from insurance beneficiaries and property subject to
a power of appointment.8 Other than these provisions the Code is
silent on who should bear the burden of the tax. Consequent courts
repeatedly held that federal law had preempted the field and state
courts could not create any rule concerning the burden of the tax.9
In 1930 the New York Legislature passed an apportionment stat-
ute.10 In Matter of Del Drago," the New York Court of Appeals held
the statute in conflict with federal law saying, "The Congress has
spoken, and it is our function to interpret, not to legislate."12 This rul-
ing ultimately led to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Riggs v. Del Drago,1 3 where the court said that federal law does not
direct how the estate tax is to be distributed, nor does it determine
who shall bear the ultimate burden of the tax. Internal Revenue Code
section 826 (b) provides only that the final impact of the tax shall be
the same as though it had first been taken out of the estate before
distribution, leaving to state law the determination of who should bear
7 Note, 40 COL. L. Rm,. 690 (1940).
8 Beneficiaries of life insurance proceeds or property subject to a power of
appointment must bear a pro rata share of the estate tax unless the will provides
otherwise. 26 U.S.C. 826 (c) & (d).
9 Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 140 N.E. 686, 687 (1923); Matter of
Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. den. Hamlin v. Wellington, 250
U.S. 672, 40 S.Ct. 14, 64 L. Ed. 1200 (1919).
IQ Laws of New York 1930, c. 709, now section 124 of Decedents Estate Law.
11 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E. 2d 131 (1941).
12 Id., 88 N.E. 2d 131, 140.
13,317 U.S. 95, 87 L. Ed. 106, 63 S. Ct. 109, 142 A.L.R. 1131 (1942).
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
the burden.14 This stand was reaffirmed at the same term of court in
Harrison v. Northern Trust Company.15 Thus, the ultimate burden of
the federal estate tax depends upon state law, since Congress has not
undertaken to deal with the question except to the extent that Internal
Revenue Code sections 826 (c) and (d) deal with life insurance
proceeds and appointive property.
In some jurisdictions the rule is that the estate taxes ultimately
must be borne by the residuary or personal estate. 16 The rationaliza-
tion of this rule is that since the tax is a debt against the estate and
since under the general rule debts are payable from the residuary or
personal estate, the tax should be payable wholly from these estates.
17
This rule generally is criticized and is made subject to many excep-
tions because of its impracticability in many situations.18
In other jurisdictions it is the rule by statute or case authority that
the ultimate burden of the estate tax must be shared ratably by every
part of the taxable estate.' 9 The rationale of this rule is that since the
tax is imposed upon the entire taxable estate, the entire taxable estate
should share in the payment thereof.20 Thus, each beneficiary is re-
quired to pay that portion of the total tax obligation which can be
attributed to the assets which he has received or is to receive.
The Kentucky Rule. Kentucky has been one of the leading states
which has reached an apportionment result as a matter of case law in
both testate and intestate estates. In the early case of Hampton's
Adm'rs v. Hampton 21 and subsequently in Martin v. Martin's Adm'rs,-2"
both involving intestate estates, the question before the court was
whether personalty and realty should share the federal tax equally
when state law provides for the payment of obligations of the estate
out of the personal property. The court held that all classes of property
'140Of course the will may direct who is to bear the tax, but this note is limited
in scope to intestate estates and testate estates where the will is silent as to the
burden of the tax.
15 317 U.S. 476, 87 L. Ed. 407, 63 S. Ct. 361 (1943).
1 0 Annotation, 37 A.L.R. 2d 150, 176 lists fourteen states of which several
have made a change in their case rule by adopting apportionment statutes, at p.
177. Alabama has a statute specifically forbidding apportionment. Ala. Code
(1940, 1951 Cum. Supp.) tit. 51, see. 449 (1).
17 Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265, 7 A.L.R.
696 (1919); Turner v. Cole, 118 N.J. Eq. 497, 179 A. 113 (1935).
18 General exceptions to the rule; (1) When the testator leaves no residuary
estate, (2) When the residuary estate is less than the tax due, (3) When the
residue is real property and taxes are to be paid out of the personalty, (4) When
the probate estate is insolvent, but the tax is due because of non-testamentary
assets, and (5) When there is no residue estate because the decedent was in-
testate. 37 A.L.R. 2d 150, 179 (1954). 19 Ibid.
20 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 94 A. 2d 703 (Del. 1953).
21 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496, 10 A.L.R. 515 (1920).
22 283 Ky. 513, 142 S.W. 2d 164 (1940).
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should make a pro rata contribution to the tax without regard to
whether the property received was personalty or realty. The court
said in the later decision:
.... Appellants contend that the tax-whatever may be its
true name or character-should be treated under our statute of Descent
and Distribution as a debt or as an ad valorem tax against all the
property comprising the estate and payable primarily out of the
personalty of the decedents estate before resorting to his real
estate .... 23
... . However, since no such requirement is made in the
federal statute levying the tax, and since it would, as held in the
Hampton opinion, be unjust and inequitable, we conclude that in the
absence of specific direction to the contrary justice requires that all
classes of beneficiaries participating in the net value of the estate left
after the federal tax is satisfied and deducted should, as between
themselves, bear their just proportion of it .... 24
In the more recent case of Trimble v. Hatcher's Ex'rs,25 the testator
had made gifts which the taxing authorities held to be in contempla-
tion of death. The court, having opportunity to pass upon the question
of apportionment of taxes in testate estates as to non-testamentary
property, held that the executor had a right to obtain contribution
from the donee. Thus the Kentucky court holds that the estate tax
must be ratably apportioned among realty, personalty, testamentary
property, and property not subject to administration.
The Huber Case. Simple though the basic rule of apportionment
may be, many problems arise in its application. One particularly dif-
ficult problem faced by the Kentucky Court was that caused by the
passage in 1948 of the "marital deduction" provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code.26 In Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber,2 7 the plain-
tiff's husband died testate and plaintiff elected to renounce the pro-
visions of the will and recover from the executor her statutory one-half
interest in the surplus personalty as provided for in Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 392.020. The plaintiff contended that, since the estate
was entitled to deduct this one-half interest from the gross estate
under the marital deduction provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,
her one-half interest was not included in the net taxable estate for tax
purposes and should not have to bear any portion of the tax imposed
upon the net taxable estate. The court held that under the rule of
equitable apportionment the plaintiff's contention was sound, saying:
'1 Id., at 516, 142 S.W. 2d at 165.
24 Id., at 518, 142 S.W. 2d at 167.
252 95 Ky. 178, 173 S.W. 2d 985 (1943).
2626 U.S.C. 812 (e) (1).
27 240 S.W. 2d 89 (Ky. 1951).
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. We conclude that if the marital allotment is a deducti-
ble item before arriving at the net taxable estate, and since that item
does not add to the tax, it cannot be burdened with any portion of
the federal estate tax. The surviving spouse, therefore, should receive
her share undiminished by any federal estate tax.
28
This case on first impression would seem to be an exception to the
rule of pro rata distribution of the tax burden. However, it is sub-
mitted that the equitable apportionment rationale of the pro rata dis-
tribution rule does support the decision. The basis of the rule of
equitable apportionment is that since the tax is imposed upon the
entire taxable estate, it is equitable for the entire taxable estate to
bear a proportionate share of the burden of the tax. Thus, since a
particular item does not ultimately contribute to the burden of the tax
because it is a deduction, it is equally equitable that such an item
should not share in payment of the tax. The same result is reached by.
many state apportionment statutes.
29
If the Kentucky Court in the Huber case had reached the final
result by only that rationalization set forth above, the case would be
28 Id. at 91.
29 Eleven state statutes provide that in apportioning federal estate taxes
among the beneficiaries, the surviving spouse should have the benefit of the
marital deduction. One example of a statute of this type is that of Pennsylvania
which seems to be a fairly uniform statute among the states.
"Apportionment of the estate tax, except as provided in section 3, shall be
made among persons interested in property includible in gross estate in proportion
that the value of the interest of each person bears to the value of the net estate
before exemption....
"Ay interest for which dedution is allowable under Federal revenue
laws in determining the value of decedent's net estate such as property passing to
or in trust for a surviving spouse and charitable, public or similar gifts or be-
quests to the extent of the allowed deduction, shall not be included in the com-
putation provided in subsection (a) ., and to that extent no apportionment
shall be made against such interest.. . Purdon Pennsylvania tit. 20 section 884
(1954) Cum. Supp.
Another example of a uniform statute is that of Tennessee. "Such proration
shall be made by the personal representative in the proportion, as near as may
be, that the value of the property, interest or benefit of each person bears to the
total value of the property, interests and benefits received by all such interested in
the estate, except that in making such proration allowances shall be made for any
deductions allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the net
estate .. " Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1952 Supp.) section 8350.7.
Other states with statutes similar to these are California, Cal. Probate Code
(Derring, 1953) sections 970-972; Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949 Rev.)
section 2076, as amended, Conn. Gen. Stat. (1951 Supp.) section 449 (b), and
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1953 Supp.) section 938c; Florida, Fla. Stat. (1951) section
734.041; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943 Reissue) sections 77-2108, as amended
by Neb. Laws (1953) c. 95; New Hampshire, N. H. Laws (1950) c. 822; Penn-
sylvania, cited supra this note; Tennessee, cited supra this note and; Virginia, Va.
Code (1950) section 64-151, as amended by Va. Acts (1952) c. 294.
The statutes of two other states could be interpreted to reach the same result
as the above statutes direct; Massachusetts, Mass. Laws Ann. (1953) c. 65 A.
section 5, and; Oregon, Oregon Laws (1949) c. 475, as amended Ore. Laws
(1951) c. 386.
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entirely satisfactory. However, in an attempt to support the result by
providing more than one leg for the decision the court said, in effect,
that it was the intention of Congress that the spouse would bear no
share of the federal tax, citing as authority In Re Peter's Will.30 This
alternative basis of the Huber decision is undoubtedly wrong. Since
the decision in the Del Drago case states have always been allowed to
place the burden of the tax. The marital deduction provisions were
not intended to change the rule in the case of the widow's distributive
share. Nevertheless, the holding in the Huber case flows logically
from the rule of equitable apportionment and its value should not be
weakened by the one wrong basis of the decision. The rule is fair and
in most cases will reach the proper result.
The applicability of the Huber case in other jurisdictions depends
upon the particular state's method of computing the surviving spouse's
share. In Ohio there are four reported decisions, the earliest being
Miller v. Hammond,31 which involve facts essentially similar to the
Huber case. The Huber decision was followed in the Miller case but
a strong dissent was written in the following language:
It should be noted further that the statutory situation in
Kentucky differs substantially from that in Ohio. In Kentucky, the
statute gives the widow a share in the 'husband's surplus personalty'
and the amount of 'surplus personalty' is determined before deduction
of the federal estate tax. Hampton's Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199,
221 S.W. 496, 10 A.L.R. 515, 518. However, as hereinbefore pointed
out, the widow's share under our statutes, cannot be determined until
after payment of the federal estate tax.32
The Miller case was followed in Campbell v. Lloyd et al.33 In
Foerster v. Foerster,34 a decision written by the Probate Court judge
whose decision had been overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in the
Miller case, the opinion was written opposing the principle of the
Miller case but its authority was undisputed and it was followed.
However, on appeal in Campbell v. Lloyd,35 the Supreme Court of
Ohio admitted its error and overruled the -Miller case on the statutory
grounds indicated in the dissent in that case. In addition to Ohio,
other states have reached a result contra to the Huber case. The ra-
tionalization of these cases is that notwithstanding the allowance by
Congress of the marital deduction, the burden of the federal tax has
always been a matter of policy for the state. Thus, the local inheritance
30 88 N.Y.S. 2e 142 (1949).
31 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. 2d 9 (1952).
32 Id., 104 N.E. 2d at 21 (Dissent, italics added).
33 117 N.E. 2d 45, Court of Appeals, Cuyahoga County (Ohio 1954).
34 122 N.E. 2d 314, Probate Court (Ohio 1954).
35 122 N.E. 2d 695 (Ohio Supreme Court 1954).
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statute must determine whether the widow's distributive share is com-
puted before or after deduction of the tax.36
Whether the principle of the Huber case will apply within a par-
ticular state depends upon the state method of computing the surviving
spouse's share under applicable state laws of descent and distribution.
Where, as in Kentucky, the surviving spouse's share is computed be-
fore the estate tax is paid, the application of the Huber principle is
sound and equitable because that share does not add to the total tax
burden. On the other hand, the application of the Campbell case is
equally sound in jurisdictions where the surviving spouse's share is
computed after payment of the federal tax because the effect of the
state statute rule is to make that share contribute to the total tax
burden.37 An analogous situation is presented when a religious or
charitable organization is to take the residue of an estate after the
specific devises have been satisfied. Its share is included in calculating
the taxable estate even though ordinarily a devise of a specific amount
would be deductible and would not bear a proportion of the estate
tax.38 The rationale is that the Internal Revenue Code does not under-
take to exempt the recipients of such charitable gifts from the burden
of the tax if placed upon them by will.39 Likewise, in states such as
Ohio the statutory rule places upon the spouse the burden of the tax
when the amount claimed as the deduction is the statutory share.40
However, even in a jurisdiction such as Ohio, if specific devises
to the spouse under terms of the will qualify as a marital deduction
then the amount receivable by the spouse should not bear any portion
of the tax, since in fact such amount does not contribute to the tax
because the statutory method of computing the surviving spouse's
share does not then become relevant. But when the spouse waives the
provisions of the will or when there is intestacy and the statutory share
provisions become applicable the spouse should bear a portion of the
tax since under the statute that spouse's portion adds to the total tax
burden.
In Kentucky, of course, it makes no difference whether the marital
36 Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 IM. App. 508, 101 N.E. 2d 604 (1951),
the widow's share is determined after payment of "all just claims," and the
federal estate tax is a "just claim;" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236
N.C. 654, 73 S.E. 2d 879 (1953), the widow's share is distributed out of the"surplus" of the estate, and the "surplus" is not determined until after payment
of the federal estate taxes; In Re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W. 2d 641
(1953), the widow's share is one-third of the "net personal estate," and the "net
personal estate" is what remains after payment of all charges against the estate.
7 Ibid. 38 Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1924). 3 0Ibid.
40 "The reasoning in the Huber case cannot be applied in the face of a state
statute which seems to direct otherwise." . .. Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. of Baltimore, 85 A. 2d 50 (Md. 1951).
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deduction is a specific devise or the statutory share since in both
situations the amount qualifying as the deduction does not contribute
to the tax burden.
Implications From The Huber Case. As interesting as the narrow
holding in the Huber case is the possibility of the extension of the rule
through the use of its rationale. "It appears to us that the apparent
purpose behind the enactment of the U.S. Code above was to . . .
prepare the way for elimination from the tax burden all those whose
legacies or allotments do not create or add to the tax."41 Thus, if a
testator made a specific devise to a religious or charitable organization
which was deductible in computing the net taxable estate it would
logically follow that,... since that item does not add to the tax is can-
not be burdened with any portion of the tax."42 Research has revealed
few cases supporting this conclusion.43 Perhaps the proposition is so
obvious that it has not been seriously litigated. However, it is sub-
mitted that in view of the rationale of the Huber case, the conclusion
does seem reasonable as a consequence of the rule of equitable ap-
portionment. In In Re Starr's Estate,44 it was said:
Unless recognition is given to the fact that deduction of the
value of the remainder vested in the charities has resulted in a lessened
total tax on the residuary and unless the source of the deduction re-
sulting in such lessened total tax is taken into account in the ap-
portionment of the taxes, the result will be that each half of the
residue of the estate will bear an equal burden of the tax, though as
to one-half only a portion of the property . . . was actually con-
sidered as subject to the tax.4
5
The court then held that the value of the remainder interest received
by the charity taking absolutely was required to be deducted from the
gross estate before computing the taxes and such interest would not
bear any portion of the tax.
The Problem of Insurance. By specific provision of the Internal
Revenue Code insurance beneficiaries must bear a pro rata share of
the burden of the estate tax unless the will directs otherwise.4 The
problem arises when the insurance proceeds are made payable in in-
stallments.47 Must the personal representative await payment to the
beneficiary and collect the tax from him, or may the personal repre-
41 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber supra, note 27 at 91.42 Ibid.
43 In De Dettmer's Will, 40 N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1948); In Re Starr's Estate, 282
N.Y.S. 957 (1935); and all of the statutes cited in note 29 supra would support
this view.
44 Ibid. 45 Id., at 959. 46 26 U.S.C. see. 826 (d).4 7 Polisher, PRORATION OF FEDERAL EsTATE TAX AMONG LrrE INSURANCE
BENEFICIAnIES, 50 DIcK L. R~v. I. (1945); Polisher, ESTATE TAX APPORTONMENT,
84 TRusTS AND ESTATES 99 (1947).
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sentative proceed against the insurance company for payment of the
tax? Regardless of the view adopted there are difficulties involved
and policy considerations to ponder. If the tax is made the responsi-
bility of the insurance company there may be a delay in the payment
of the proceeds to the beneficiary. If the executor must await payment
to the beneficiary and then proceed against him for the tax the ad-
ministration of the estate will be seriously hampered and delayed.
Kentucky has never passed on this problem in a reported decision, and
the courts that have are divided, being faced with a difficult task of
choosing between two conflicting policy considerations.
New York has held that after the estate tax for which the insurance
proceeds are responsible has been paid by the executor, the executor
shall then be paid the tax by the insurance company and the amount
of the tax deducted from the total of the future payments to the bene-
ficiaries and the amount of each installment readjusted.48 Pennsylvania,
however, has held that apportionment may not be enforced against
the insurance company but that the executor must collect the tax
at such time as the beneficiary receives the installment.4 In the opinion
of the Pennsylvania court, to hold otherwise would constitute an im-
pairment of the obligation of the contract between the insurance com-
pany and the decedent.
It is submitted that Kentucky would follow the New York rule. In
TraveleFs Insurance Co. v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 0 which
was unreported in the official reporter because the opinion was with-
drawn, the court said that a judgment against the insurance company
does not impair the obligation of the contracts between the insured
and the insurance company because no one by contract may circumvent
the authority of the government to impose a tax.51
The Attorney's Problem. To this point the estate tax has been dis-
cussed only in connection with intestate estates or testate estates
where there is no specific tax clause in the will. However, as indicated,
the law is fairly clear when this type estate is confronted. The greatest
bulk of questions today in relation to estate taxes concerns the in-
tention of the testator as to the burden of the estate tax when there is
a specific tax clause. The following discussion will not attempt to be
exhaustive but will only indicate the problems confronting the attorney
who is drafting a tax clause.
5 2
48 In Re central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 536, 10 N.E. 2d 538
(1937); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 43-2 U.S.T.C. par. 10, 071 (Ky.
1943) opinion withdrawn and appeal dismissed 44-2 U.S.T.C. par. 10, 126.
49 In Re Moreland's Estate, 351 Pa. 623, 42 A. 2d 63 (1945).
50 Cases cited note 48 supra. 51 44-2 U.S.T.C.C., p. 10, 413.
52 For extensive treatment see, Annotation, 37 A.L.R. 2d 7 (1954).
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In Trimble v. HatcheFs Exrs, 3 the Kentucky court had before it a
will which directed ". . . payment of all taxes on all property which I
may own at my death." Two years prior to his death the testator had
made gifts which were held to be in contemplation of death under the
Internal Revenue Code provisions. The case is primarily significant
for the rule of ratable recovery by the executor. But in the course of
the decision the court construed the tax clause as referring only to
testamentary property and held that since the testator did not "own"
the non-testamentary property at his death, the beneficiary of the gifts
should bear a ratable proportion of the estate tax. It is of course
speculative as to whether the testator knew that these gifts might be
taxed as part of the gross estate. Perhaps he knew that they might be.
However, it is possible that the testator did not know it and if he had
known, he would have specifically directed exoneration from payment
of the tax. Regardless of the conclusion, the tax clause did cause litiga-
tion.
Thus, the attorney's problem in drafting a tax clause for a will is
first to ascertain the probable assets of the estate as defined by the
Internal Revenue Code and then to determine which of them are
testamentary, which of them are non-testamentary, and whether the
testator has previously made an inter vivos gifts, trusts, or other trans-
fers which might possibly be subject to the estate tax. The attorney
must then determine the testators wishes as to who is to bear the
burden of the tax and who is to be exonerated. Finally, the attorney
must draft a tax clause which clearly and specifically states the testa-
tor's intentions. Thus, the attorney cannot do his professional best
unless he has a thorough understanding of the Internal Revenue Code,
a complete summary of the testator's property which is includible in
the gross taxable estate, and the patience to draft a tax clause ade-
quately reflecting the testator's intentions.
In conclusion, the law is clear on who shall bear the burden of the
estate tax in intestate estates and testate estates when there is no
specific tax clause. In Kentucky the rule of apportionment prevails.
Property qualifying for the marital deduction is exonerated. The tax
created by insurance payable in installments probably must be paid
by the insurance company. There is no question concerning the right
of the testator to shift the tax burden and exonerate some parties as
long as there is sufficient property to pay the tax.54 The question most
frequently arising, however, is whether the language actually used in
a tax clause is effective to shift the tax burden from those on whom
the law otherwise places it. J. MONTJOY THIMvBLE
53 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W. 2d 985 (1943).
54 Y.M.C.A. v. Paris, supra note 32.
